



AN ANALYTIC MODEL (3F COORDINATED EFFORT WITH








Dctober 1978 - May 1979









Rear Admiral T.F. Dedman Jack R. Borsting
Superintendent Provost
The work reported herein was supported by the Office of Secretary of
Defense, Director of NET Assessment, Washington, DC.
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.
This report was prepared by:
AN ANALYTIC MODEL
OF COORDINATED EFFORT WITH
















12. GOVT ACCESSION NO
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
AN ANALYTIC MODEL OF COORDINATED EFFORT WITH
APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEM OF SURVEILLANCE C<*
7. AUTHORfsJ
Paul H. Moose and
Don E. Harrison, Jr
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Research (Technical)
October 1978 - May 1979
6 PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93940
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93940
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERfs;
MI PR # DWAM 90002
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 ADDRESS^/ dilterent from Controlling Oflice)
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Director of NET Assessment
Room 3A930
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
12. REPORT DATE
May 1979
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
79
15. SECURITY CLASS, (ot thia report)
Unclassified
15a DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT rot thia Report)
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20. it different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide If neceaaary and Identify by block number)
Cybernetics, Command & Control, Surveillance, Entropic Measures,
Markov
Chains, Computer simulation, Centralized versus decentralized
control.
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on revere, aide It neceeeary «d .'*»n"£/fcf'?^ "^"fnn rvhprnPtlC techniques . It
A two-level surveillance system is modeled using cyoe e ic
t-mn e:*,
is shown that if system entropy is used as a measure of
system performance,
tssteSdy state average becomes a sensitive discriminate between
alternative
ontrol modes, such as between central and local control
It a so measure
the system's sensitivity to variations in sensor resources,
their capabilities
and the pSl cy by which'they are allocated. It is concluded
that formation*
ally derived measures of performance, such as entropy, are
appropr ate for C
modeling in many cases and that they can prescribe quantitative
tradeoffs in a
raf^ ^-TIONOFINOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 l
Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Snt.rad)
Summary
The evaluation of effectiveness of different command control policies
for allocating limited resources in hierarchal decision making systems,
like the military, requires an analytical model of system behavior. In
general, it has been found difficult to describe overall system behavior
in mathematical terms. However, in the class of systems which exist pri-
marily to provide information about the military environment, like sur-
veillance systems, some progress has been made which is reported here. In
such systems, entropy, i.e., mathematical uncertainty, characterizes the
dynamic behavior in a very fundamental way. When the system is in equili-
brium, the average entropy measures performance.
In this work, a two level surveillance system is studied. A cyber-
netic model is developed from which an ergodic Markov process model and
the characteristic entropy function are determined. Computer simulation
results are presented that show relative performance curves for "central"
and "local" control modes. Several levels of sophistication in resource
allocation policies are compared for each modality. The effects of communi'
cations delays, sensor mobility, and target dynamic behavior are considered
Extensions of the model to more complex surveillance environments is dis-




2. The System 9
3. A Cybernetic Model of 'The System' 15
4. Multi -Level System Models 26
5. System Performance 31
6. The Computer Model 40
7. Results 47
8. Discussion and Conclusions 58
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 2.1 Organization Chart of a Hypothetical
Surveillance Command 10
Figure 3.1 The Elementary Cybernetic Model
of a System 16
Figure 3.2 Model of "The System" 21
Figure 3.3 Time Line Showing Various Delays
Involved in One Cycle of Behavior 22
Figure 4.1 The View from the Top 27
Figure 4.2 The View at Intermediate Level Commands 29
Figure 5.1 A "Typical" Behavior Pattern of System
Entropy 32
Figure 5.2 System Operating Regimes 35
Figure 5.3 First Order Markov Chain Model of the
Surveillance Process 38
Figure 7.1 Cumulative Distribution Function:
Time to Detection 48
Figure 7.2 Average Entropy by Timestep 49
Figure 7.3 Computed Markov Transition Probabilities 50
Figure 7.4 Stationary State Probabilities 51
Figure 7.5 Surveillance Efficiency - Central Control -IIA 54
Figure 7.6 Surveillance Efficiency - Random Search- IB 55
Figure 7.7 Surveillance Efficiency - Local Control -IA 56
Figure 7.8 Surveillance Efficiency - Random with Central
Control -IIC 57




Table I Control Mode/Regulation Policy
Combinations Tested 45




Analysis of C systems is made difficult by our inability to specify
the relationships of communications and control to the macroscopic
variables which determine overall system performance. No two problems
seem alike, and most analyses are subsystem specific and scenario
dependent.
At the root of the difficulties lie two largely unresolved theoretical
issues that inhibit the practical application of multi-level systems
3
theory to C ; 1) analytic models of cooperative/competitive behavior at
common command levels and, 2) sufficiently general, yet quantitative,
means to characterize the role of information in complex man-machine
1 2decision-making systems ' do not exist.
As an example, consider the problem of determining the degree of
local antonomy versus centralization of control for decision making in
the conduct of military operations. Although an age old military issue,
it reappears in popular debate as the technologies of communication,
data storage and data manipulation have expanded exponentially during
the later half of this century. Even though the general nature of the
objectives at various echelons may be similar, they differ in many de-
tailed ways that directly affect their expression in the decisions of the
different commanders. Thus, any attempt to quantify system performance,
in terms, say of a simple goal-directed behavior model, is extremely dif-
ficult. A more sophisticated model is required to measure the relative
Bandoyopadhyay, R. , "Information for Organizational Decision Making -
A Literative Review", IEEE Trans, on Sys. Man and Cyb., SMC-7 , Jan. 77.
2
Mahmoud, M.S., "Multi-Level Systems Control and Applications: A Survey",
IEEE Trans, on Sys. Man and Cyb., SMC-7, #3, March 77. (p. 125-143)
merits of various control alternatives. Part of the problem in developing
such a model is that identical information has different utility for dif-
ferent decision makers. This is the case at the same as well as at dif-
ferent hierarchal levels, and at different times during the evolution of
any given systemic process.
It is clear that information, and its quantitative characterization,
3
are essential to the development of a utilitarian theory for C . Communi-
cations concerns the transmission of information from point a to points
b, c, ..., or from person a to persons b, c, .... Control selects an action
taken in accordance with a decision or choice, that is based on (or
driven by) information. In general, management or command hierachies
come only in indirect contact with their physical environment. The com-
mander's image of the environmental situation and his decisions to take
specific actions are filtered through intervening levels. So, in fact, in-
formational quantities are the majority, if not the entirety, of the relevant
3
set of system variables in the study of C .
In this paper we focus our attention on the second of the problems
mentioned earlier, that is, the quantitative characterization of system
performance in terms of ordinary measures of information. In order to
3
treat the multi-level class of problems, into which military C surely
3
falls, we shall adopt the coordination concepts of Mesarovic et al., .
A quite general treatment of the laws of information which govern systems
4
has been described recently by Conant . He suggests that "the fact that
information theory fits neatly the hierarchal architecture which is so
3
Mesarovic, M.D., Macko, D. and Y. Tokahara, "Theory of Hierarchal Multi-
Level Systems", New York, 1970, Academic Press.
4
Conant, R.C., "Laws of Information which Govern System", IEEE Trans, on
Sys. Man. and Cyb., Vol. SMC-6, April 1976.
prevalent in systems of many sorts seems ^/ery suggestive and indicates
5
that the relation between information and system dynamics is a deep one" .
In this paper we shall show that for a dynamic system whose objective is
the reduction of uncertainty about the environment, in the face of random
behavior by environmental variables, a steady state entropic variable
provides a sensitive and quantitative ranking of control policies. Further-
more, we will show that the cybernetic structure, which characterizes
behavior at both supremal and infimal levels, may be understood in terms
of a very small number of macroscopic, intensive system parameters. Simu-
lation results are presented that support this claim and which strongly
suggest the possibility that a more complete analog between cybernetic




Schnakenberg, J., "Thermodynamic Network Analysis of Biological System",
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1977.
2. The System
The specific problem investigated in this research concerns allo-
cation of surveillance sensor resources to locate and track objects that
are moving in a large area or space, A. Each sensor can, at periodic
intervals, attempt to detect objects in a much smaller area or subspace,
X, centered about the search coordinates assigned to it for that epoch.
A number of such sensor resources are assumed to be available, however,
they are not all endowed with the same performance parameters. Each
sensor type is characterized by a probability of detection (the probability
it will report an object present in its area X when the object is there) and
a probability of false alarm (the probability it will report an object
present in its area A when, in fact, it is somewhere else).
The different types of sensors are assigned to different surveillance
subsystem commanders. These subsystems constitute the infimal level of
the surveillance system. Each time a subsystem detects an object, its
location is reported to a common commander, the overall surveillance
commander, "SURVCOM". SURVCOM is the supremal level of a two-level sur-
veillance system. Organizationally, the system is structured as shown
in Figure 2.1
.
SURVCOM has been tasked to know the location of all the objects in
the surveillance space A at all times. In practice, however, there are
insufficient total sensor assets to accomplish this task perfectly, so
SURVCOM must do the best job possible within the constraints imposed upon
him by systemic as well as by resource factors. Included in systemic
factors are the basic organization structure, the behavior of the infimal
level commanders, the mobility of resources and the varying demands that
"SURVCOM"
:
"SURV 'A'" "SURV B*
"
/
"SURV , x ,n
sensor sensor sensor
species A species B species X
Figure 2.1
Organization Chart of a Hypothetical Surveillance Command
are made upon him by his superiors or customers for the surveillance
information. Resource limitations include, in addition to the limited
number of sensors, the capacity and time delays of communications with
subordinates, time delays subordinates have in communicating with or
moving their sensors, and the personnel, processing or data storage
limitations that might exist at the various system nodes.
Infimal level commanders have the same overall responsibility as
their commander, they must try to keep track of the objects. In addition,
10
they have to follow orders, which he may give them from time-to-time,
about where to look or how to deploy their sensors. Besides following
orders and trying to keep track of the objects, the infimals may have other
local goals or objectives that will enter into the decisions they make.
Some of these may be explicitly stated and sanctioned, or originated, by
the commander; e.g., to maintain a high morale among the assigned personnel,
to conserve limited materials such as fuel or aircraft hours, to maintain
a high level of readiness by keeping some fraction of their resources in
reserve, etc. Some objectives may be less up front; e.g., establishing
an especially high level of efficiency for surveillance vis-a-vis other
infimal level commanders in order to enhance personal chances for promo-
tion, maintenance of a high level of informal cooperation with certain
other infimal commanders in support of standing personal relationships
or former associations, exaggerating the emphasis on training in antici-
pation of future demands against more elusive objects, etc. The point
is, that although each commander adheres to the overall objective of the
entire system, i.e., to fulfill its purpose as an organization created
to keep track of objects, the variety of the functional goals that exist
at the various system nodes will result in a wide range of overall system
behaviors and performance efficiencies. Perhaps the only other common
goal each commander will have is try to assure that the portion of the
system he is responsible for survives, i.e., preserves its fundamental
character . It is within this complex individual motivational framework
that one must define the role of information, attempt to measure its
The tendency of systems to "act in such a manner so as to preserve
their character" is known as the Principle of LeChatelier. See, e.g.,
"Living System", James Grier Miller, McGraw-Hill, 1979.
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utility and devise a means to differentiate between alternate operational
control policies; policies that will involve varying degrees of information
transmission and processing.
Two extreme modes of operational control can be envisioned. At one
extreme, SURVCOM makes all the decisions about the allocation of all the
sensor assets at ewery time epoch. In this mode, the infimal levels make
no operational decisions (they may still be making many administrative
decisions that can indirectly effect operational performance), they merely
serve as conduits to and from the sensors.
At the other extreme, the local commanders make all operational
decisions abouth the deployment of the sensors assigned to their commands;
they report to SURVCOM the location of the objects, if and when they detect
them. We shall call the first control mode 'central' or 'supremal' control
and the second control mode 'local' or 'infimal' control. Obviously, these
two modes require radically different communications support systems.
The commander(s) must have an allocation policy for his sensors,
regardless of the control mode of the system. The policy, in practice,
is the "guidebook" or "rules" a commander uses to make operational decisions
about the appropriate action to take for a given (environmental) situation.
The policy is constrained by the characteristics of his resources, but,
within these constraints, is designed to Fulfill his goals. To the
extent that constraints and goals can be clearly defined and explicitly
described, one may talk about finding "optimum regulation policies".
However, in practice, the subjective and variable nature of many of the
dimensions of the commander's "goal space" makes the search for an optimum
policy somewhat academic. However, a useful approach, and the one
12
followed in this research, is to define a sensitive measure of effective-
ness for the commonly held and explicitly stated purpose of the system.
With such a measure, one finds the sensitivity of the commonly accepted
view of achievement to variations of the constraints, the regulation policy,
(and control mode as well) thereby gaining a deeper insight into the true
nature of the system behavior.
The constraints placed on commanders of the surveillance system
concern, in addition to the number and detection capabilities of their
sensor assets, the rapidity with which they can move sensors from place
to place in the surveillance space, the communications capacity and com-
munications delays to and from the sensors, and the processing and data
handling speed and capacity they can employ to utilize information ob-
tained from prior time epochs to choose the "best" course of action for
the next epoch(s). In addition, the prior knowledge (intelligence)
commanders have (about the number and dynamic behavior of the objects they
are attempting to survey) is important and can be viewed as a constraint.
Constraints permitting, a commander may consider a variety of sensor
coverage allocation policies. For example, the commander may just "seed"
the space A randomly with sensors and wait for the object to come within
range, reporting a location as one stumbles unwittingly within coverage
of a sensor. Or, once an object is detected, the commanders may try to
concentrate sensors into a subspace, A Q , in which they are certain the
object must be by virtue of their prior knowledge about the objects
mobility. Finally, a commander may deploy his sensor resources at any
time epoch in such a way as to maximize the probability he will locate
as many objects as possible. In order to do this, he uses all the
13
information available to him; that means all he knows about where the
objects could conceivably be, (based on the rapidity with which they can
maneuver) plus what he has learned from searching various areas in prior
epochs in which the objects were not successfully detected. Systemic
resources must be, of course, more elaborate to pursue this latter policy
than either of the other two.
The three regulation policies and two control modes described above
by no means exhaust the possibilities for either. However, they represent
3
some typical C alternatives for which one may desire to measure surveil-
lance system performance. The fact that differing alternatives require
different sunk costs and operating costs, that they have differing suscept-
abilities to counter-measures and deceptions, and that they fulfill, to
greater or lesser extent, other more subjective goals of the various de-
cision makers, combine to form a rationale for locking at alternatives
in the first place. The purpose of an analysis is only to quantify the
sensitivity of the "overall", or "bottom line" measure of system perfor-
mance to policy and/or constraint/resource changes, and to gain insight
into the nature of the system's dynamic behavior and stability.
14
3. A Cybernetic Model of 'The System'
Nowhere in the preceding description of 'The System' has it been
explicitly stated that a model must be specified in order to carry out
the analysis. Nevertheless, it must be apparent that we have at least
had a 'conceptual model' of a real (either actual or hypothetical) sur-
veillance system in mind. In this section we shall become quite explicit
about such a system model. The structure we seek must include all the
"relevant" features of the surveillance problem, but at the same time be
sufficiently explicit to admit to analysis (in this paper by simulation).
A general form of the cybernetic system model, developed originally
Q
by W.R. Ashby , forms the basis for the approach followed here. However,
important additions have been adopted in order to account for the indirect
contact all of the commanders have with their environments.
The Canonical Form
The basic cybernetic model is shown in Figure 3.1. The Environment
is sensed; Disturbances are transmitted as inputs to the System. The
System transforms the inputs into outputs, the Actions. The nature of the
transformation is controlled by the System Regulator, acting in accordance
with a regulation policy which has been adopted to achieve the system
goals. Prior Knowledge, or Intelligence, is used by the Regulator to
assist the formulation of a successful policy. The Actions initiated by
the System become Environmental Outcomes. The resultant environmental
situation is the source of new Disturbances that stimulate the System,
and so on.
o
















The Elementary Cybernetic Model of a System
Consider the application of this structure to the situation encountered




. Natural environmental variables
Disturbances
. Sensor surveillance reports
. Orders from higher level commander
. Intelligence reports (number and type of objects known to be
in A; semi -static variables)
Actions
. Decisions about new sensor locations
. Reports to higher level commanders
16
Outcomes
. New sensor locations
. New object locations
Note that each of these variables may be quantified, including, inso-
far as they relate to the operational problem of tasking the sensors, the
orders from and reports to a higher level commander. Also note that each
of these variables are microscopic in nature; they describe the "nitty-
gritty" behavior of the system as a function of time. If one could ob-
serve the actual values of these variables as a function time, the result
would be a set of stochastic variables. None of the variables change
more frequently than some minimum time interval, t . If all the functions
are sampled at a rate equal to or less than t , the resultant N-dimensional
sequence of random numbers can be considered a single realization of an
N-dimensional sequence of random variables characterizing the modeled
behavior. If one observes sequences that are "typical", regardless of
when one looks, the process will be considered to be ergodic, (time and
ensemble averages may be exchanged). More importantly, if the process is
statistically stationary, so that averages, densities, etc., are independent
of time of observation, then the system is in "steady state" or in "equili-
brium with its environment". We shall be interested in determining under
what conditions the surveillance system can be considered an ergodic and/or
stationary random process.
Transformations
Figure 3.1 models system behavior by assuming that certain of the
variables described above are causally related. In the diagram, this is
•
The fact that when contrasted with systems in conflict, (such as occur in
gaming), information collection and dissemination systems seem to be more
readily modeled as systems in equilibrium is of considerable practical im-
portance as one seeks suitable macroscopic measures of performance.
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explicitly indicated by boxes labeled, T(x|y), where x are the inputs
and y the outputs of the transformation T.
1. T(A|0): Transformation of Actions to Outcomes
a) The action of ordering sensor i to search in area A. is assumed
to produce the Outcome as ordered (i.e., with no error), but with
some delay, 6-iq, due to communications delays and/or the time
required for the sensor to move from its present to its new
location. 6«| may not be less than zero, (causality); it may
be a known or a random variable.
b) The action of sending a report of the detected target locations
to a higher level commander is modeled in a similar fashion; that
is, the Outcome is that the higher level commander receives the
report with no errors, but due to communications delays, at some
time after the action taken to send it.
2. T(E|D): Transformation of Environmental Situation to System Disturbances
a) The Environmental situation representing an order from a higher
level commander, about how or where to allocate sensor resources,
is assumed to be transmitted with no error, but with the possi-
bility of a communications delay, <5r|n-
b) The Environmental situation represented by the location of an
object in the space A, and sensors covering the sub-space A.
results in a disturbance or input to the System in the form of
a surveillance report. As with the other transformations, there
may be communications delays associated with the preparation and
transmission of the reports. But, in this case, it is unreason-
able to model the sensor transformations as error free. Sensors
18
are assumed to make errors of two kinds; 1) They may report an
object in cell X. when it is in cell A
,
(a flase alarm), or
J K
2) They may fail to report the object in A. when it is in A. (a
j j
false miss) .
We shall model the sensors as follows: Let p. be the prob-
ability an object is in cell A.. Let r\ . be the probability that
J J
the sensor j reports an object in cell A.. Let y be the prob-
ability that no sensors report the object's location (a miss).
The transformation prescribing the combination of the object
location and sensor locations that produces the surveillance


























In (3-1), the sensors are characterized by their probabilities
of detection, a.., probabilities of miss a.. = 1-a.., and prob-
abilities of false alarm, a., (probability sensor j reports object
in X. when it is in X, ). Note that at eyery epoch, a subset of
3 K
the a., must be zero (and a.. = 1), since there are insufficient
33 33
sensor assets to cover all N cells of the object space A. However,
since sensors are moved about and the location probabilities of the
19
target depend on prior events, the sensor transition matrix,
[a] and the object location vector p are both dynamic, albeit
deterministic, entities, [a] and p may also depend on natural
environmental conditions.
3. T(D | A) : Transformation of Disturbances to Actions
If one thinks of the "The System" as a "Black Box", the T(D|A)
characterizes the transformation of inputs to outputs, i.e., the transfer
function of the system. If the outputs for all the inputs are measured,
the resultant transformation would, in the absence of random behavior,
completely specify the system if it were an electromechanical or chemical
system. However, if one tries to do this in an organizational decision
making system, such as the one being studied here, one finds that the
same inputs do not always result in the same outputs, and that these
deviations are not, at least not all, caused by random behavior. In fact,
the system is sentient, it thinks and acts in accordance with the best
interest of its own survival and in order to achieve its stated goal. This
property, one unique to "Living Systems", is modeled by the Regulator.
The Regulator is the thinking (analytical) and decision-making (commanding)
element of the system. The Regulator processes the input Disturbances,
analyzes the situation, considers constraints and alternatives, (what
transformations, i.e., what actions are possible), takes account of the
goals, objectives and prior knowledge and decides on a course of action.
The decision sets the transformation for the current (and perhaps some
future) time epoch(s). The Regulator is the "steersman" of the system,
the controller. Without it one does not have a cybernetic model.
Steersman (icugepvnTna) is the Greek origin of the word Cybernetic
20
The model of the regulated transformation is shown in Figure 3.2 with

















Model of "The System"
There may be some time delay, 5 (D | A) , involved in the decision making
process, as well as in communicating to and from the sensors/environment.
This is illustrated in the diagram of Figure 3.3, t is the minimum system
cycle time.
Regulation Policies and Decision Making
The function of the decision maker in the cybernetic model is to act
as the Regulator of the input/output transformation. The regulation policy









Environmental Event (Sensor detects or)
misses object
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Disturbance (Surveillance report input to
"The System" )
-Action (Order issued repositioning sensors)
Environmental Outcome (Sensor detects or miss*
object in its new locat.
Figure 3 .
3
Time Line Showing Various
Delays Involved in One Cycle
of Behavior
Z2
his goals, and on a number of subjective factors such as personal moti-
vation, etc., as described in Section 2. The subjective aspects are ^/ery
hard to account for in an overall system analysis. However, much insight
is gained by assuming the commander is "goal -directed", i.e., he will
act, within his constraints, in such a way as to best, or most nearly,
achieve the stated goal of the system; in the present analysis the goal is
to keep track of the objects.
The nature of regulation policies is best illustrated by examples:
1. Fixed-Distributed Sensors (FDS)
This is the simplest case, The nature of the sensors is such
that they cannot be moved; they are immobile. At the time the sensor
system was installed, it was known that the objects movements in the space
A would be random. Therefore, the sensors were seeded randomly over the
space A. Since sensors cannot be repositioned, there is no action the
commander can take to improve his tracking performance, regardless of the
inputs. The System merely serves to pass along the detection reports
from the sensors to the higher level commander. Detections occur ran-
domly when the object wanders near a sensor. System performance is solely
dependent on the quantity and quality of the sensors.
2. Concentrating Sensors
In this case, the commander is able to move the sensors about,
although it may take time. Once an object is detected, the commander
concentrates his sensors in the sub-space dynamically accessible to the
object. The commander has prior knowledge about the dynamic behavior,
*Moving sensors about may not only take time, it may consume fuel , reduce
readiness, wear out equipment, etc. That is, there may be costs as well
as gains associated with this policy.
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i.e., the nature and speed of the objects motion, so that he is able to
compute the size and location of the object's sub-space at the time his
sensors will be on station. Let t„ be the relaxation time for the object.
Then if t > tD , the commander cannot react in time to gain any advantageC K
from concentrating his sensors. If t « t„, one presumes that following
a policy of "concentrating sensors" will be superior to the FDS policy.
We shall illustrate this advantage in a quantitative and quite general way
in the analytical part of this paper.
3. Miss Minimization (Neyman-Pearson Strategy)
If, in any given epoch, all the sensors report "no target", the
commander has gained some information about where the object "isn't". One
would suppose that this information could be combined, along with the know-
ledge of target dynamics, to enhance the chance of finding the object on
the next epoch. In fact, this is true; this "negative information" can
be used as follows:
a. Calculate a revised distribution of target location probabilities,
given a miss (Bayes Rule).
W - (p i (V • 5ii"*<V < 3 - 2 '
b. Project the new distribution forward to the next search epoch
based on knowledge of the object's dynamic behavior.
P-(t + 5 A/n ) =
Z
P.(t ) d..(6 nm ) (3-3)
l n A/0 j j n ij K A/0 v '
where: d-j-j^/wg) = probability that the object moves from
X. to \. in the time 5 fl/n .
J l A/
U
To make use of this information, the objective must be specified
functionally. Suppose the objective is to maximize the probability of
This is the elapsed time from a detection until the object can be anywhere
in the space A, i.e., it's location uncertainty has returned to the maximum.
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detecting the object (or equivalently to minimize the probability of
missing the object) at the next opportunity. Furthermore, suppose that
the false alarm probabilities are independent of the sensors' search area
(constant false alarm condition). Then, the probability of a miss is mini
mized by assigning the sensor with the maximum probability of detection
to the most probable cell, the second best sensor to the second most
probable cell, and so on in descending order. This is called the miss
minimization or Neyman-Pearson policy.
25
4. Multi -Level System Models
The surveillance system's hierarchal nature merely acknowledges the
reality of modern organizational practice in military as well as in civilian
institutions. Although the theory of bureaucracy is not at issue in this
research, accounting for bureaucratic behavior is.
In the organization of Figure 2.1, two levels are explicitly identi-
fied, the supremal level ("SURVCOM") and the infimal level (the Surveil-
lance Sensor "Type Commands"). (There is also a tertiary level, the
individual sensor commander, that is implicitly recognized in the indirect
coupling that the Sensor "Type Commanders" have with their environments.)
There are two views one can adopt in order to describe the two-level, or
two-layer, nature of this system. (The terms used are from the canonical
cybernetic model shown in Figure 3.1.) The first of these is the "view
from the top". It is schematically illustrated in Figure 4.1.
In Figure 4.1 the intermediate level commands appear, as part of the
chain of command, to be an integral part of the indirect coupling between
the top level commander and the environment he wishes to control. Infimal
levels are seen as transformations that compress, filter, and distort
information being passed upward, sometimes introducing errors and inevit-
ably introducing delays in the transmission process. Information being
passed downward, orders or advisories, is retransmitted to the sensors,
and ultimately to the environment, embellished with additional detail and
specificity, data elements that are added in the Action-to-Outcome trans-
formation applied to SURVCOM 1 s responses by the intermediate commanders.
The downward flow also suffers delays in transmission. In a "smoothly J












The View from the Top
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knowledge at the intermediate level of the overall operational flow and
of the operator's role in the surveillance process allows him to "anti-
cipate" the actions of his superior and have his resources readied.
The top level commander's success in accomplishing his overall goal,
in this case the location of target objects, depends on his ability to
indirectly manipulate the sensors and receive their reports. He may, be-
come more successful by understanding and exploiting the bureaucratic
response of his overall organization, just as he may excel by exploiting
the technical characteristics of his sensor resources. He may in frus-
tration, attempt to change the organization structurally in order to mini-
mize errors and delays. An obvious way to do this is by by-passing, at
least for operational matters, the intermediate levels. This choice,
remoting and centralizing operation control, ususally requires extra long-
haul data communications capacity and larger central staffs and processing
facilities. Arguments, pro and con, for centralized vice de-centralized
operational control should, at least partially, be based on a rational,
quantitative estimate of their relative effects on overall system perfor-
mance. One object of our research, of which this paper represents a first
step, is to provide an analytic methodology to address just such struc-
tural realignments of the level of decision-making.
The second view of "The System" is the one maintained by the inter-
mediate level commanders, in this case the Sensor Type Commanders. Their
"image" of the organizational process is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The
essential difference between the two views is that for the infimal level
commanders the supremal level represents but another part of the total





The View at Intermediate Level Commands
to respond to environmental stimuli i of "SURVCOM" so as to promote his
local objectives and goals while maintaining stability (homeostasis).
Another essential feature of this model is that the total environ-
mental situation depends on the Actions of his fellow Type Commanders as
well as his own Actions and the behavior of the target objects. It is
conceivable that by "cooperative behavior", the infimal commanders may
find mutual enhancement of all of their individual goals. That is, the
overall system performance, in keeping track of the objects locations can
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be superior to that obtained by each commander responding solely in order
to optimize his own performance. It is also possible for one commander
to discover a policy that substantially enhances his own system's perfor-
mance but that results in drastically inferior performance by his colleagues,
This is commonly found in systems that promote "competitive behavior" where
the competitors, all theoretically equal, i.e., at common levels of command,
are equipped with dissimilar types of resources. If changing the policy
of one commander increases his performance, and increases or leaves un-
changed the performance of all the other commanders at the same command
level, then instituting the policy change is synergistic. If a systematic
search is made of all policies for all infimal commanders, adopting a policy
if it meets the above criterion and discarding it if it does not, the re-
9
suiting multi-nodal control policy is called the Pareto optimum policy .
In summary, the two views are seen to be quite different. At the
supremal level, the infimals are a structually imposed transfer function
between the commander and the real environment. Their effects are to be
coordinated to achieve the best overall results. Their independence tends
to inhibit direct environmental cause and effect behavior. At the infimal
level, the supremal commander appears as one more, somewhat unpredictable
environmental disturbance to be dealt with, and hopefully controlled by
transmitting appropriately designed responses. Other infimal commander's
decisions may be affecting the local situation. It may be possible to
cooperate with them, necessary to compete with them, or desirable to ignore
them. Understanding stability and performance levels of various local con-
trol policies, as well as the relative costs of implementation, also moti-
vates the development of an analytical model.
9
See e.g., Henderson and Quandt, "Microeconomic Theory", McGraw-Hill, 1958
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5. System Performance
The overall objective of the surveillance system is to determine, at
all times, which of N cells, the sub-spaces X. of A, are occupied by target
objects. The cell number, j, is presumed to locate the object to the
desired accuracy. The maximum locational uncertainty, that is the maximum
entropy, of any one target object is
H = log N (5-1)
max y 2
v
If there are M target objects, and they move about independently of one
another, the total maximum uncertainty is just MH 2 . In order to simplifymax
the discussion, we consider one target object in this analysis. Generali-
zations to objects whose movements are not completely independent and
whose uncertain whereabouts is of unequal utility is left for a future
development.
Let D be the number of cells which could possibly contain the target






The objective of the surveillance system is to maintain the actual system
entropy
N
H = Z P. log 9 (1/P.) (5-3)
i=l
] c ]
as close to H . as possible. If one observes the behavior of H over amm





A "Typical" Behavior Pattern of System Entropy
When the object is completely lost, H is at H . Immediately after
° K J max
J
a detection by a sensor, it falls to H . . If it is re-detected in themm
next time interval, it stays at H . . If not, H grows; the amount it
grows depends on D as well as the search policy. The correct distribution
of probabilities to use in Eq. (5-3) is given, at each time tick, by Eq.
(3-3). At any time, the object may or may not be re-detected. If it is,
H falls to H . , if not, the area of uncertainty grows,mm J 3
Eq. (5-2) gives the minimum uncertainty because it has been postulated
already that no Action can occur in a time less than one epoch. Thus,
by the time a commander can make any use of his newly acquired knowledge
that the target is located in cell \., the target may already have moved
to one of D-l adjacent cells, or have stayed in the cell in which it has
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just been found. In terms of our previous mathematical notation,
D = Number of non-zero {d..}, v ieN, (5-4)
assuming that the number of cells to which it may move is independent of
its location. Clearly, D is a measure of the target's dynamic behavior.
(For example, it is proportional to the square of the maximum velocity of
a randomly manuevering target object.)
Although H(t) is clearly a random process, the character of its
behavior is strongly influenced by the capabilities and the quantity of
surveillance sensors, by the dynamics of the object and by the size of
the space. Presumably it also depends on the organization of the system
and resource allocation policy. A useful theory must distinguish, as
sensitively as possible, between control policy alternatives. It must also
indicate, in a quantitative way, the costs/benefits associated with per-
turbations of systemic constraints/resources.
Using our present microscopic model as a guide, it is possible to
define several important, intensive macroscopic system variables that
grossly determine the operating regimes: "Search", "Surveillance" and
"Tracking". These are as follows:
a. N = A/A : Size of the Object Space (Number of cells)
b. D (Eq. (5-4)): Dynamics of the Object
N
c. S = Z a.. : Sensor Coverage
i=l
n
It is extremely useful to consider the operating point of a particular
An assumption we maintain in part by having the spatial index set closed,
i
>e
" Vj = v
Recall that a-j-j is the probability of detection in cell i. Although this
varies from epoch to epoch, the sum is constant, providing sensors are allo-
cated unambiguously. Although some policies may permit overlap, we retain
the unambiguous definition of S as our measure of system potential.
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system to be established by its location in the space defined by a specific
detection coefficient, y . = S/N, and a specific holding coefficient,
y, = S/D. This space is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
First note the area is bi-sected by the line D = N. The operating
point lies in the Regions B&C of the diagram, D = N, if either the target
dynamic, or the minimum time epoch (sensor re-visit time), or both, are
so large that the target location can always expand to fill the entire
space by the time the sensors look for it again. This is the pure "Search"
condition. Knowledge of the target's prior location is of no value.
(H = H . ). Performance is largely set by v.. For y , > 1, Region C
max mm 3 J J 'd d
enough surveillance coverage has been provided to more than cover eyery
possible target cell at every look. If y, < 1, Region B, detection and
false alarms events are determined by the ordinary means of detection theory,
When D < N, knowledge of the object's prior location is, in general,
of use in deciding where to look next. In this operating regime Regions
A, D & E, a commander can concentrate his resources (assuming they are
sufficiently mobile) in the restricted area that the target can occupy to
improve his chances of re-detection. If his surveillance coverage sub-
stantially exceeds the target maneuverability, y, » 1, he can, in principle
maintain track of the target once it has been detected. Thus, in the region
y, > 1 , Region D & E, the system can only be in one of two possible states;
"Search" or "track".
The triangular region defined by y, < 1 , y < 1 and y, > y (i.e.,
D < N), is the "Surveillance" operating regime (Region A). Here, there
are sufficient surveillance sensor resources to cover the entire space A,
It is of no value to the surveillance process per se. It may be of value
to some other system, a weapon system for example, but only if the receipients
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or even the sub-space A~. But An < A (target partially located) suggests
that through proper manipulation of the resources, the times between re-
detections may be kept small and the average system uncertainty can be
kept close to H . . If the resources are poorly controlled, times betweenr mm v J
detections may be long and the average uncertainty may be much closer to
H
max
It is in the "Surveillance" operating regime that we wish to establish
the role of information to determine, in a quantitative way, the cost
of communications delays and to distinguish relative value of alternative
control policies and between alternative modes of control-
36
In the Surveillance operating regime, the behavior of the system can




: System in search. Object completely lost.
S, : Object just detected.
Sp : Object detected on previous epoch. First re-detection
attempt unsuccessful.
S~ : Object detected two epochs ago. First and second re-
detection attempts unsuccessful
.
^m_i : Object detected approximately M epochs ago. Subsequent
re-detection attempts unsuccessful. If next re-detection
fails as well, object will be completely lost again, i.e.,
system returns to state S .
Each of these states is accompanied by a characteristic entropy that
depends, primarily, on the target manueverability. However, the prob-
abilities of transitioning to the next state, or back to S-,
,
depends
strongly on the system resources, S, and the way they are managed. State
transitions are illustrated schematically in Figure 5.3.
If the probabilities of the system being in each of the M states at
step n of the Markov process is given by the vector p(n), then, q steps
later
P(n + q) = [P] q p(n)




First Order Markov Chain Model











An important feature of this model is the on-going, more or less
"steady-state", type of behavior that the system exhibits. This is only
true in the "Surveillance" regime. Note that as long as none of the
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transition probabilities of Figure 5.3 are identically zero, the system
has no final or terminal states. That is, over time, it will cycle around
and continually reach eyery state. On the average, it will be in each
state an amount of time determined by the stationary state probabilities,
p . These can be determined from the state transition matrix, Eq. (5-6)
*
alone.
Since each state has a characteristic uncertainty, the average uncer-
tanity of the system is given by
E[H] = fl* • P
s
(5-7)
where H is the characteristic entropy vector associated with system states.
On the average, the surveillance system is supplying
I = H
max
- E(H) bits, (5-8)
of information about the location of the object. A dimensionalless, but
informational ly based measure of system effectiveness is given by computing
the fraction of the maximum available information that, on the average the
system produces. Thus,




measures system performance in a very fundamental way. We shall use I as
the measure to distinguish between control modes, to rank regulation policies
and to investigate sensitivity to such things as communications delays, the
quality and quantity of system assets (sensors) and their mobility.
There are a variety of ways to compute p s from [P]. A rather simple
numerical method is to raise [P] to successively higher powers until the
columns are all identical. Every column is then equivalent to p s .
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6. The Computer Model
The cybernetic model has been applied to a simple computer model of
the search process. This model consists of a single target free to move in
a space of numbered cells. Two searchers investigate the cells with limited
sensor resources according to specified rules. The searchers make use of
the information obtained in unsuccessful searches to attempt to improve
their performance in the next timestep. Because the model is yery simple,
state entropies and transition probabilities between states can be deter-
mined from the repeated trials.
The model can be initialized in either of two ways:
1. with the target lost; the model then gives the entropy of the final
or 'lost' state. This is called the search mode.
2. with the target detected; at the previous timestep the searchers
then attempt to 'hold' the evading target and the model gives
transition probabilities between intermediate states and the
entropies associated with those states. This is called the sur -
veillance mode.
Each information handling policy must be run in both modes to obtain the
data required to complete the model. The search mode will not be mentioned
further in this report, except to indicate how the computations are performed
The user controls the model by specifying the number of cells in the
space, N, and the ability of the target to evade the searcher. This ability
is determined by the dodge variable, D. This variable is closely related
to the dynamic variable of the theory. The variable D is best introduced
by an example: suppose that D = 3, then if the target is located in cell
k at timestep n, it may be in cell k-1 , k or k+1 at timestep n+1 . A value
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of D = 5 would make cells k-2, k-1 , k, k+1 , and k+2 accessible.
When D is 'small' the searchers have no difficulty holding the target,
while a 'large' D means that the target almost always escapes. Here 'small'
and 'large' must be determined in terms of the other variables of the model.
The searchers are labeled A and B. The capability of each searcher
is determined by two parameters: the number of cells which it can search




, and the probability of detection for each
searcher, a.^ and a
R
. This is the probability of detection, given that the
searcher examines the cell occupied by the target. The capability of a
searcher is the product of number of cells it can investigate times the
probability of detection in each cell. Thus L. * a
A
measures the capability




(Yj < 1 ) » otherwise, the target never manages to evade successfully. In
most of the cases examined values of a, = 0.5 and a
R
= 1.0 have been used
to provide contrast between perfect and imperfect capability.
Because a. and an have effectively been fixed in all of the cases dis-A B
cussed here, a case is determined by the four numbers, N, D, L«, and L
R
.
False alarm probabilities have been set to zero.
The computer model goes through three phases during each timestep.
Each phase denotes a change in value of the location probability vector
p. At the beginning of each timestep, the searchers are about to commence
their search on the basis of the location probabilities available to them.
Assume that the target is not detected. Then after the search each searcher
has more information about the target's location because, presumably, it
has learned from the failure of the search. The entropy of the system is
decreased in this phase, but the searchers are unable to act until the next
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timestep. Before then, the target manuevers, which means that the location
probabilities change the entropy increases, and the searchers must consider
a larger search region when they re-allocate their sensors.
To understand this process in greater detail, consider the following
example: The stated conditions of the model are (10, 5, 2, 2). This means
that the space contains 10 cells, the dodge variable, D = 5; because L- = 2,
searcher A can examine two cells, as can searcher B because L
R
= 2. Suppose
that the target was detected in the previous timestep in cell 6. At the
beginning of this timestep the location probability vector is:
cell #0123456789
p : (0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0}
Now suppose that searcher A examines cells 4 and 5 while searcher B examines
cells 6 and 7. No detection is made. As a result of the search we can be
sure that the target was not in either cell 6 or cell 7 because a
R
= 1.0,
but some probability remains that it is in either cell 3 or cell 4 be-
cause a* = 0.5. In these cells the location probability has been reduced
by a factor of a. = 1 .0 - a. = 0.5 so that the unnormal ized location prob-
abilities are:
cell#0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
p : (0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0}
and the normal ized location probabilities for phase II are (see Eq. 3-2):
p : {0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .25 .25 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0}
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The location probabilities for phase III are calculated by redistri-
butioning the probability from each cell over the cells accessible from
it if the target were to be evading from that location. Thus the 0.25
probability of cell 4 is equally distributed over cells 2 through 6, the
0.25 from cell 5 over cells 3 through 7, and the 0.5 from cell 8 over
cells 6 through (because the universe closes on itself). At the end of
this timestep the location probability vector has become (see Eq. 3-3))
,
cell # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
p : (0.1 0.0 .05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 .15 0.1 0.1}
This vector becomes the basis of the search decisions for the next timestep
and the process is continued.
Note that it is physically impossible for the target to be in cell 1.
It is somewhat surprising that cells 6 and 7 are the best place to look
because they were examined unseccessfully last timestep, but they have
high probability values because there are a number of ways that they could
be occupied.
In this example the information picture has been constructed as it
might be seen by a commander who was coordinating the search efforts of
A and B. A similar picture can be constructed from the data available to
A, or to B, but it will be different, and search decisions based on the
three pictures will not coincide.
It is important to realize that the final location probability pic-
ture at phase III depends upon the search strategy used in the timestep.
For example, suppose that the cells searched by A and B are interchanged
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in the example developed above. Now searcher B examines cells 4 and 5
while searcher A examines cells 6 and 7. If a detection is not made,
the unnormalized location probabilities are:
cell # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
p : {0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0)
and the phase III picture becomes:
cell #0123456789
p : 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 .05 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 .15
which is quite different from the earlier result. In particular, there
are now three cells where the location probability is zero, where formerly
there was only one. The difference occurs because the evasion process is
more effective from the final picture of the first example (after search)
than it is from the second.
Obviously even such a relatively simple example can lead to a number
of final pictureswhich are subtly different. While the detailed information
contained in the location probability picture is required for tactical
planning, the excess detail tends to obscure differences and make comparison
between pictures more difficult.
A basic tool in the cybernetic approach is the assignment of entropy
at the end of each timestep. The entropy,
N
H = E p. log. (1.0/p.); p. t , (6-1)
i=l
1 L n n
at the beginning of the timestep was 2.322 and at the end 3.084. When the
search strategy was revised, the final entropy became 2.684.
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It is apparent that the final entropy from the second strategy is
significantly smaller than from the first. The lower value reflects the
fact that with strategy 2 the target is contained within seven cells,
while with the first nine were accessible. Without commenting upon the
ability of the strategies to detect the target in this timestep, it is
clear that the second leaves the searchers with a smaller region to search
in the next timestep when they fail in this one. Thus it is a better
tracking or containment strategy, and this characteristic has been faith-
fully reproduced by the reduction of entropy.
Seven control mode/regulation policy combinations have been examined
in the computer model. They are listed in Table I.
TABLE I. Control Mode/Regulation Policy Combinations Tested
I. Local Control
A. Search of the cells which have the highest probability of con-
taining the target on the basis of the information available
to the individual searcher.
B. Each searcher searches randomly over the entire target space.
II. Central Control
A. The top level commander directs the most capable searcher to the
highest probability cells and the other searcher to the next
highest probability cells on the basis of the composite picture
which he has generated from their previous reports.
B. This is the same as case IIA except that the less capable searcher
does a random search in cells which have not been searched, but
which have some non-zero probability of containing the target.
C. Here both searchers do a random search (without overlap) in the
region which must contain the target.
D. Here both searchers do a random search (without overlap) in the
entire space.
E. In this case the commander directs the searchers to the areas
least likely to contain the target, but which have some non-
zero probability of containing the target.
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These policies were chosen for examination because from experience the
reader can intuitively rank them in order of increasing effectiveness.
Policy 1 1— E was included as an ultimate worst case, which it is.
Each control policy was implemented in each of 11 scenarios in which
N, D, L. and L
R
are specified. In all scenarios a. = 0.5 and a
R
= 1.0.
These scenarios span region A of Fig. 5.2, as indicated by the points on
that figure.
A cycle of the program consists of the following steps:
1. On the basis of the information obtained in the preceding search,
determine the entropy of the system at the end of the search.
2. Allow the target region to grow, (as indicated in the example),
calculate the new location probability vector and obtain the new
entropy of the system. Each searcher calculates his own location
probability vector, and a third, based on the combined information,
is calculated if the policy includes central control.
3. Based on the control policy, assign cells for each searcher to
investigate.
4. Randomly move the target to a new position in accordance with the
dodge variable D.
5. Search. If detection occurs, record the statistics and start a
new run; otherwise, return to step 1 and continue.
A sufficient number of trials must be run for each policy and scenario
to obtain reasonably good statistics. Most of the data reported here were
obtained from runs of 500 replicas, but occasionally 1000 were obtained.
The complete program is reproduced in Appendix A. Policy changes are
made at the indicated location. The program is an example where central
control is used. The local control program is somewhat simpler.
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7. Results
As indicated in the previous section, the program generates a mass
of data. In this context, the data serve to exercise the theory to ascer-
tain whether the calculations coincide with our impression of the expected
outcome for each policy.
The most primitive statistic to examine is the distribution of times
to re-detection, see Fig. 7.1. Only three policies are included in this
figure, but they are sufficient to demonstrate the results. The cases shown
are CDF (Control Central Policy No. II. A), Local Control (Policy No. I. A)
and Random Search (Policy No. I.B). Clearly the CDF dominates the other
two at all timesteps for this scenario. In fact, it does for all scenarios,
as one would expect. Note that the combination of all seven policies and
11 scenarios would generate 77 curves similar to those shown in Fig. 7.1.
We should comment that the average entropy at each timestep is not a
particularly useful measure for the policies, see Fig. 7.2. (Here it
appears that local control is better than central control at timestep 2.)
It is somewhat surprising that this y^ery primitive system mirrors an argu-
ment which is often debated in the operational forces. We will return
to this point in the discussion.
Given the information contained in Fig. 7.1, a straightforward calcu-
lation determines the Markov transition probabilities, see Fig. 7.3, the
stationary state probabilities, see Fig. 7.4, and from the stationary state
probabilities and the state entropies, Fig. 7.2, the surveillance efficiencies,
I.
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The set of values, referred to as a 'scenario' above, describes
the size of the space (N), the dynamic capability of the target (D),
and the detection capability (S) of the searchers by assigning a fixed
number of assets to each. The relative capability of the target and the
searchers can be varied over a broad range of values by adjusting these
four numbers. The actual scenarios used in this study are listed in Table
II. In all cases cc
R
= 1.0, and usually a. = 0.5 (except in one scenario
#11, a. = 0.3). These scenarios are rather widely dispersed over Region
A, of the Surveillance Space; see Fig. 5.2.
The surveillance efficiencies for the eleven scenarios and the central
control policy are plotted against the holding coefficient, (S/D*) in Fig.
7.5. Except near y h
= 1 • 0, the efficiencies lie very closely along a
straight line. The theory associates that line with the central control
policy. The dotted line in Fig. 7.5 is the corresponding policy line for
the random search policy (Policy I.B), see Fig. 7.6. Other policies are
bounded by these two limiting cases, see Figs. 7.7 and 7.8. Note that
local control is clearly always better than uncoordinated random search,
but that a coordinated random search slightly dominates local control in
all scenarios.
To summarize: the theory when applied to this simple model produces
a unique number, the slope of the surveillance efficiency line, which is















lo lO LO uO co lo LO to Lf3 LO ro
<=c











































CM ro CO CO CT^
53
:



































S < \M H \H H
\UH 1 \
fa \










J rH \H fC V
fa ^1 \
> +J \+ \
ffl a +D CD \
C/3 U \ \\ V\ V\ \\ \\ \
\\













































1 \ + \
• A \ \\ \w
o U > \
§ (TJ \ \0) \ \





« C x + \
D ro \ N
























































S \ V r-V \ \
\ ^ \ <D

















* \ + \
fa
i N \ \
fa






fa v \ v
u u \ v
§ \ \ *J •J u \ \ \H \ \ +H
>
H
(0 \ \ + >
OS u
V \ \
D N \ x













































8. Discussion and Conclusions
Although the computational model is extremely primitive it faithfully
mirrors many real surveillance effects, and a surprising amount of sur-
veillance lore can be extracted from it. The variables are unfamiliar,
but they allow simple interpretations of complex real world phenomena.
The surveillance efficiency is a measure of effectiveness which codi-
fies information about the present status of the system together with
locational probabilities in such a way that it becomes possible to talk
about the average, or steady state, status of the system under a given
control policy. It successfully mirrors policy, not just the more directly
measurable variables which describe the target and the searchers. These
directly measurable variables are subsumed into the holding coefficient
which quantifies the relative capabilities of the target and the searchers.
Fig. s 7.5 to 7.8 clearly indicate that the holding coefficient, y,, fairly
describes relative capabilities in the presence of a large number of policies
A linear relationship between I and y, holds very well except near
the boundary between regions A and D of Surveillance Space (see Fig. 5.2).
This is the boundary between Markovian and bi-stable behavior; it is not
surprising that this simplified model fails at the transition. Examination
of Figs. 7.5 to 7.8 clearly indicated that the failure is not policy
dependent, although it is certainly more evident with some policies ( I IA
and IB) than with others (IA and IIC).
The individual data points do not lie exactly on the trend lines, but
for stochastic results the deviations are minor for the relatively small
samples considered. There is no evidence that the deviations are either
policy or scenario sensitive. The policy ordering indicated in the figures
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is maintained without exception for every scenario. Certain scenarios were
chosen to have the same holding coefficient, 1 and 4 and 2 and 3. The
variations in surveillance efficiency between these pairs is our best
measure of the reproducibility of the results.
The parameters normally associated with a surveillance process are
buried in the holding parameter. Additional search assets, or better
performance of existing assets (increased a ) appear as an increase in S
A
and hence in y,. Note that the model suggests that the same assets deployed
on additional platforms will not increase performance unless a larger number
of cells can be investigated in a given epoch. The model distinguishes
between the number of assets, L , and the performance of each asset, a .
X A
For constant a , an increased search speed would be modeled as an increased
L , that is, larger area searched.
The revisit interval and target speed are described by D. If the re-
visit time is long, the target has a longer time in which to move, and D
is correspondingly increased. Similarly, if the target speed were in-
creased, D should increase to indicate that the area which must be searched
2
has increased. This area, and hence D, should go as (.speed) .
The model reinforces our intuition in several respects. Fig. 8.1 gives
an example of the effects created by moving between two policy lines.
Suppose that a surveillance system is operating at point A (I = 0.3, with
Y h
= 0.6). The commander has two options: either he can change to another
policy, point B, which retains the same efficiency at a reduced cost
{y, = 0.34) or, if the same assets are deployed the efficiency can be in-
creased to 0.53 by a change in policy. Depending on the mission either
the re-deployment of assets, point B, or the improved efficiency, point C,




shows how effort expended to improve control policy can be traded for effort
expended to improve sensors.
Even more subtle ideas can be interpreted from these results. The
effect of increased "time-late-on-target" must be interpreted as an increase
in D (the target has more time to dodge) and point E indicates the new
efficiency. Time-late can be traded-off with increased assets (stay at
point A by increasing S) or by policy improvements, the move to point F.
Communications delays also increase D and can be traded-off in the same way.
The results we have presented in this paper so far suggest that a great
deal can be learned from a relatively simple model of a two-level military
3
decision-making system. The application to the problem of surveillance C
made the choice of entropy as a fundamental measure of performance obvious.
We believe that entropy plays a central role in the characterization of
3
many other military C I systems too. There remain, however, a number of
3
important issues regarding the application at hand, surveillance C .
An important model extension concerns characterization of the target
environment. To summarize, the present simulation treats a single target
moving randomly in a one-dimensional closed space. Furthermore, no coupling
has been allowed between the Actions of the Surveillance Commanders and
the target's motions. We should like to treat a variable number of target
objects moving in a two-dimensional space which has absorbing and emitting
walls (targets allowed to exit and enter the space). Furthermore, in
practice target objects may belong to different species; the locational
certainty of the species may be of unequal value to the surveillance com-
manders. Sensors may identify the species (surveillance report contain
location and classification information) or not (reports contain location
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information only). The target's dynamic behavior may not be purely random
and may, in fact, be coupled to the movement of, or proximity to, the
sensors. These ramifications can, and should be, studied within the frame-
work of the cybernetic model used here.
Another dimension relates to the characterization of the surveillance
sensors themselves. False alarm probabilities were included in the defini-
tion of the sensor transfer function, but in the computer simulations
they were set to zero. A study of the effect of a significant number of
false alarms, accompanied by a correspondingly appropriate increase in
detection probability on overall system performance is definitely war-
ranted. The question: "Would allowing more false alarms, in order to get
more detections, materially affect overall system performance and, if so,
in what way?", needs to be answered even for several of today's operational
systems. It seems that further exploration of this dimension of our model
may be yery useful in that regard.
A third dimension to be explored is the overall complexity of the organi
zational structure. Only a two-level system has been modeled. (A terti-
aray level, the sensor commanders, has been included implicitly.) The
computer simulation results are for only two, infimal level commanders.
Additional fractionization of the infimal level may be important, however,
we would expect the system performance always to fall between the best
case of centralized, optimum control (Fig. 7.5, Policy IIA), and the
worst case of fixed distributed sensors with no control (Fig. 7.6, Policy
IB). Adding additional operational levels of overall system organization
only seems reasonable if the goals and/or environment of the model are
enriched. Some benefits may be derived by explicitly including the
behavior of indiviudal sensor commanders. To do this requires they be
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given goals and decision making capacity. In general, lower level com-
mander's decision alternatives are more specialized and detailed than their
superiors. Again, a richer model will result by their inclusion.
Finally, it seems certain that additional information is embedded in
the entropy random process, H(t). In particular the average rate of
fluctuation of H(t) is believe, based on a statistical mechanics analog,
to embody a measure of "internal information flow". If so, this is ex-
tremely important. It will allow the internal informational and decision
making complexity of a system to be characterized by an observable, macro-
scopic system variable.
One can also imagine a control policy based on a real time estimate of
H(t). A commander may wish to reduce locational uncertainty below some
critical threshold during an important time interval so that an action may
occur elsewhere in the system, such as the launching of aircraft, movement
of troops, etc. Thus, we can imagine resources being allocated in accord-
ance with a more complicated goal description than that investigated here.
Further research into specifying the goals or objective functions of the
commanders appears warranted and will enrich the model as well as our under-
3
standing of the processes of C as a whole.
Further investigation of the analogy between cybernetic, system dynamic
models and statistical thermodynamic models appears to be an exciting and
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